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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-990
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DALE FARRAR and PAT SMITH, co-administrators
of estate of JOSEPH D. FARRAR, deceased, PETI-
TIONERS v. WILLIAM P. HOBBY, JR.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[December 14, 1992]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We decide today whether a civil rights plaintiff who
receives a nominal damages award is a -prevailing party-
eligible to receive attorney's fees under 42 U. S. C. 1988.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an
award of attorney's fees on the ground that a plaintiff
receiving only nominal damages is not a prevailing party.
Although we hold that such a plaintiff is a prevailing
party, we affirm the denial of fees in this case.
                      I
  Joseph Davis Farrar and Dale Lawson Farrar owned
and operated Artesia Hall, a school in Liberty County,
Texas, for delinquent, disabled, and disturbed teens.  After
an Artesia Hall student died in 1973, a Liberty County
grand jury returned a murder indictment charging Joseph
Farrar with willful failure to administer proper medical
treatment and failure to provide timely hospitalization.
The State of Texas also obtained a temporary injunction
that closed Artesia Hall.
  Respondent William P. Hobby, Jr., then Lieutenant
Governor of Texas, participated in the events leading to
the closing of Artesia Hall.  After Joseph Farrar was
indicted, Hobby issued a press release criticizing the Texas
Department of Public Welfare and its licensing procedures.
He urged the department's director to investigate Artesia
Hall and accompanied Governor Dolph Briscoe on an
inspection of the school.  Finally, he attended the
temporary injunction hearing with Briscoe and spoke to
reporters after the hearing.
  Joseph Farrar sued Hobby, Judge Clarence D. Cain,
County Attorney Arthur J. Hartell III, and the director
and two employees of the Department of Public Welfare
for monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C.
1983 and 1985.  The complaint alleged deprivation of
liberty and property without due process by means of
conspiracy and malicious prosecution aimed at closing
Artesia Hall.  Later amendments to the complaint added
Dale Farrar as a plaintiff, dropped the claim for injunctive
relief, and increased the request for damages to $17
million.  After Joseph Farrar died on February 20, 1983,
petitioners Dale Farrar and Pat Smith, coadministrators
of his estate, were substituted as plaintiffs.
  The case was tried before a jury in the Southern
District of Texas on August 15, 1983.  Through special
interrogatories, the jury found that all of the defendants
except Hobby had conspired against the plaintiffs but that
this conspiracy was not a proximate cause of any injury
suffered by the plaintiffs.  The jury also found that Hobby
had -committed an act or acts under color of state law
that deprived Plaintiff Joseph Davis Farrar of a civil
right,- but it found that Hobby's conduct was not -a
proximate cause of any damages- suffered by Joseph
Farrar.  App. to Brief in Opposition A-3.  The jury made
no findings in favor of Dale Farrar.  In accordance with
the jury's answers to the special interrogatories, the
District Court ordered that -Plaintiffs take nothing, that
the action be dismissed on the merits, and that the
parties bear their own costs.-  Id., at A-6.
  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  Farrar v. Cain, 756 F. 2d
1148 (1985).  The court affirmed the failure to award
compensatory or nominal damages against the conspirators
because the plaintiffs had not proved an actual
deprivation of a constitutional right.  Id., at 1151-1152.
Because the jury found that Hobby had deprived Joseph
Farrar of a civil right, however, the Fifth Circuit
remanded for entry of judgment against Hobby for
nominal damages.  Id., at 1152.
  The plaintiffs then sought attorney's fees under 42
U. S. C. 1988.  On January 30, 1987, the District Court
entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $280,000 in fees,
$27,932 in expenses, and $9,730 in prejudgment interest
against Hobby.  The court denied Hobby's motion to
reconsider the fee award on August 31, 1990.
  A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the fee award.
Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F. 2d 1311 (1991).  After
reviewing our decisions in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755
(1987), Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1 (1988) (per curiam),
and Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent
School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), the majority held that
the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and were
therefore ineligible for fees under 1988:
-The Farrars sued for $17 million in money damages;
the jury gave them nothing.  No money damages.  No
declaratory relief.  No injunctive relief.  Nothing. . . .
[T]he Farrars did succeed in securing a jury-finding
that Hobby violated their civil rights and a nominal
award of one dollar.  However, this finding did not in
any meaningful sense `change the legal relationship'
between the Farrars and Hobby.  Nor was the result
a success for the Farrars on a `significant issue that
achieve[d] some of the benefit the [Farrars] sought in
bringing suit.'  When the sole relief sought is money
damages, we fail to see how a party `prevails' by
winning one dollar out of the $17 million requested.-
941 F. 2d, at 1315 (citations omitted) (quoting
Garland, supra, at 791-792).
The majority reasoned that even if an award of nominal
damages represented some sort of victory, -surely [the
Farrars'] was `a technical victory . . . so insignificant and
. . . so near the situations addressed in Hewitt and
Rhodes, as to be insufficient to support prevailing party
status.'-  941 F. 2d, at 1315 (quoting Garland, supra, at
792).
  The dissent argued that -Hewitt, Rhodes and Garland
[do not] go so far- as to hold that -where plaintiff obtains
only nominal damages for his constitutional deprivation,
he cannot be considered the prevailing party.-  941 F. 2d,
at 1317 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
  We granted certiorari.  502 U. S. ___ (1992).
                     II
  The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2641, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1988, provides in
relevant part:
-In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title,
title IX of Public Law 92-318 . . . , or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.-
-Congress intended to permit the . . . award of counsel
fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits.-
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758 (1980) (per
curiam).  Therefore, in order to qualify for attorney's fees
under 1988, a plaintiff must be a -prevailing party.-
Under our -generous formulation- of the term, -`plaintiffs
may be considered -prevailing parties- for attorney's fees
purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit.'-  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S.
424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d
275, 278-279 (CA1 1978)).  -[L]iability on the merits and
responsibility for fees go hand in hand; where a defendant
has not been prevailed against, either because of legal
immunity or on the merits, 1988 does not authorize a
fee award against that defendant.-  Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U. S. 159, 165 (1985).
  We have elaborated on the definition of prevailing party
in three recent cases.  In Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755
(1987), we addressed -the peculiar-sounding question
whether a party who litigates to judgment and loses on
all of his claims can nonetheless be a `prevailing party.'-
Id., at 757.  In his 1983 action against state prison
officials for alleged due process violations, respondent
Helms obtained no relief.  -The most that he obtained was
an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have
been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim.-
Id., at 760.  Observing that -[r]espect for ordinary
language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to
prevail,- we held that Helms was not a prevailing party.
Ibid.  We required the plaintiff to prove -the settling of
some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant
towards the plaintiff.-  Id., at 761 (emphasis omitted).
  In Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1 (1988) (per curiam),
we reversed an award of attorney's fees premised solely
on a declaratory judgment that prison officials had
violated the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.  By the time the District Court entered judgment,
-one of the plaintiffs had died and the other was no
longer in custody.-  Id., at 2.  Under these circumstances,
we held, neither plaintiff was a prevailing party.  We
explained that -nothing in [Hewitt] suggested that the
entry of [a declaratory] judgment in a party's favor
automatically renders that party prevailing under 1988.-
Id., at 3.  We reaffirmed that a judgment-declaratory or
otherwise--will constitute relief, for purposes of 1988,
if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant
toward the plaintiff.-  Id., at 4.  Whatever -modification
of prison policies- the declaratory judgment might have
effected -could not in any way have benefited either
plaintiff, one of whom was dead and the other released.-
Ibid.
  Finally, in Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland
Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), we
synthesized the teachings of Hewitt and Rhodes.  -[T]o be
considered a prevailing party within the meaning of
1988,- we held, -the plaintiff must be able to point to a
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal
relationship between itself and the defendant.-  489 U. S.,
at 792.  We reemphasized that -[t]he touchstone of the
prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration
of the legal relationship of the parties.-  Id., at 792-793.
Under this test, the plaintiffs in Garland were prevailing
parties because they -obtained a judgment vindicating
[their] First Amendment rights [as] public employees- and
-materially altered the [defendant] school district's policy
limiting the rights of teachers to communicate with each
other concerning employee organizations and union
activities.-  Id., at 793.
  Therefore, to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights
plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of
his claim.  The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable
judgment against the defendant from whom fees are
sought, Hewitt, supra, at 760, or comparable relief through
a consent decree or settlement, Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S.
122, 129 (1980).  Whatever relief the plaintiff secures
must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or
settlement.  See Hewitt, supra, at 764.  Otherwise the
judgment or settlement cannot be said to -affec[t] the
behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.-  Rhodes,
488 U. S., at 4.  Only under these circumstances can civil
rights litigation effect -the material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties- and thereby transform the
plaintiff into a prevailing party.  Garland, supra, at
792-793.  In short, a plaintiff -prevails- when actual relief
on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.
                     III
                      A
  Doubtless -the basic purpose of a 1983 damages award
should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights.-  Carey v. Piphus, 435
U. S. 247, 254 (1978).  For this reason, no compensatory
damages may be awarded in a 1983 suit absent proof of
actual injury.  Id., at 264.  Accord, Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 307, 308, n. 11
(1986).  We have also held, however, that -the denial of
procedural due process should be actionable for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury.-  Carey, supra, at
266.  The awarding of nominal damages for the -absolute-
right to procedural due process -recognizes the importance
to organized society that [this] righ[t] be scrupulously
observed- while -remain[ing] true to the principle that
substantial damages should be awarded only to
compensate actual injury.-  435 U. S., at 266.  Thus,
Carey obligates a court to award nominal damages when
a plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to
procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.
  We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal
damages is a prevailing party under 1988.  When a
court awards nominal damages, it neither enters judgment
for defendant on the merits nor declares the defendant's
legal immunity to suit.  Cf. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U. S., at 165; Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 738 (1980).
To be sure, a judicial pronouncement that the defendant
has violated the Constitution, unaccompanied by an
enforceable judgment on the merits, does not render the
plaintiff a prevailing party.  Of itself, -the moral
satisfaction [that] results from any favorable statement of
law- cannot bestow prevailing party status.  Hewitt, 482
U. S., at 762.  No material alteration of the legal
relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff
becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree,
or settlement against the defendant.  A plaintiff may
demand payment for nominal damages no less than he
may demand payment for millions of dollars in
compensatory damages.  A judgment for damages in any
amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the
defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing
the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise
would not pay.  As a result, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit erred in holding that petitioners' nominal
damages award failed to render them prevailing parties.
  We have previously stated that -a technical victory may
be so insignificant . . . as to be insufficient to support
prevailing party status.-  Garland, 489 U. S., at 792.
The example chosen in Garland to illustrate this sort of
-technical- victory, however, would fail to support
prevailing party status under the test we adopt today.  In
that case, the District Court declared unconstitutionally
vague a regulation requiring that -nonschool hour
meetings be conducted only with prior approval from the
local school principal.-  Ibid.  We suggested that this
finding alone would not sustain prevailing party status if
there were -`no evidence that the plaintiffs were ever
refused permission to use school premises during non-
school hours.'-  Ibid.  The deficiency in such a
hypothetical -victory- is identical to the shortcoming in
Rhodes.  Despite winning a declaratory judgment, the
plaintiffs could not alter the defendant school board's
behavior toward them for their benefit.  Now that we are
confronted with the question whether a nominal damages
award is the sort of -technical,- -insignificant- victory that
cannot confer prevailing party status, we hold that the
prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude
of the relief obtained.  We recognized as much in Garland
when we noted that -the degree of the plaintiff's success-
does not affect -eligibility for a fee award.-  Id., at 790
(emphasis in original).  See also id., at 793.
                      B
  Although the -technical- nature of a nominal damages
award or any other judgment does not affect the
prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of
fees awarded under 1988.  Once civil rights litigation
materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties, -the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes
to the reasonableness- of a fee award under Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).  Garland, supra, at 793.
Indeed, -the most critical factor- in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award -is the degree of success
obtained.-  Hensley, supra, at 436.  Accord, Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 11 (1985).  In this case, petitioners
received nominal damages instead of the $17 million in
compensatory damages that they sought.  This litigation
accomplished little beyond giving petitioners -the moral
satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that
[their] rights had been violated- in some unspecified way.
Hewitt, supra, at 762.  We have already observed that if
-a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,
the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an
excessive amount.-  Hensley, supra, at 436.  Yet the
District Court calculated petitioners' fee award in precisely
this fashion, without engaging in any measured exercise
of discretion.  -Where recovery of private damages is the
purpose of . . . civil rights litigation, a district court, in
fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to
the amount of damages awarded as compared to the
amount sought.-  Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 585
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).  Such a
comparison promotes the court's -central- responsibility to
-make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under
the circumstances of the case.-  Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989).  Having considered the amount
and nature of damages awarded, the court may lawfully
award low fees or no fees without reciting the 12 factors
bearing on reasonableness, see Hensley, 461 U. S., at 430,
n. 3, or multiplying -the number of hours reasonably
expended . . . by a reasonable hourly rate,- id., at 433.
  In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally
-prevails- under 1988 should receive no attorney's fees
at all.  A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but
receives no more than nominal damages is often such a
prevailing party.  As we have held, a nominal damages
award does render a plaintiff a prevailing party by
allowing him to vindicate his -absolute- right to
procedural due process through enforcement of a judgment
against the defendant.  Carey, 435 U. S., at 266.  In a
civil rights suit for damages, however, the awarding of
nominal damages also highlights the plaintiff's failure to
prove actual, compensable injury.  Id., at 254-264.
Whatever the constitutional basis for substantive liability,
damages awarded in a 1983 action -must always be
designed `to compensate injuries caused by the
[constitutional] deprivation.'-  Memphis Community School
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S., at 309 (quoting Carey, supra,
at 265) (emphasis and brackets in original).  When a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failure to prove an essential element of his claim for
monetary relief, see Carey, supra, at 256-257, 264, the
only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.  In an
apparent failure to heed our admonition that fee awards
under 1988 were never intended to -`produce windfalls
to attorneys,'- Riverside v. Rivera, supra, at 580 (plurality
opinion) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)), the
District Court awarded $280,000 in attorney's fees without
-consider[ing] the relationship between the extent of
success and the amount of the fee award.-  Hensley,
supra, at 438.
  Although the Court of Appeals erred in failing to
recognize that petitioners were prevailing parties, it
correctly reversed the District Court's fee award.  We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                                  So ordered.